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Abstract  
Mainstream adherence to land titling as a strategy to address rural poverty  has 
gained even more sway against the backdrop of the contemporary 
phenomenon of large-scale farmland acquisitions,  known to some as “global 
land grabbing”. The orthodox narrative, embraced in toto by organisations such 
as the World Bank, is that formal property rights mitigate the risks of these 
land acquisitions and allow the poor to access the benefits of these 
acquisitions. This paper attempts to critically investigate this narrative by 
problematising the land titling–land grabbing nexus under the lens of adverse 
incorporation. Situating the study in a bio-ethanol plantation in Isabela 
province, Philippines, the research compared two groups of small-holder 
farmers: one group with titles and another without titles. Initial findings show, 
firstly, that land titles do not neutralise the risks of adverse incorporation for 
farmers in highly-asymmetrical agrarian societies or protect against the market 
pressures that bear upon these farmers and secondly, that titles may, in fact, have 
a lubricating rather than insulating function—drawing title-holders into the global 
value chain and compromising their prospects for more equitable, pro-poor 
outcomes. In conclusion, the paper proposes a recasting of the land titling 
paradigm: viewing land titles not as apparatuses with invariant outcomes, but 
as contested tools for truly meaningful rights assertions. 
 
Keywords 
Land grabbing, land titling, Philippines, bio-fuels, adverse incorporation. 
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Land Title to the Tiller 
Why it’s not enough and how it’s sometimes worse 
1 Introduction 
The image is always a visually-arresting one: that of a weatherbeaten farmer, face browned by 
the punishing sun and etched with the tell-tale lines of a hard life, holding in her hands a title 
with her name. A title formally recognizing in law what her truths had always known. No 
longer invisible. No longer excluded. 
However, the entire gamut of outcomes and experiences in agrarian 
societies all over the world (see for example, Ho and Spoor, 2006; Thorpe, 1997), 
tends to demonstrate that the narrative embedded in that image is a simplistic 
one. In truth, the populist discourse that has framed land titling programs for 
small-holder farmers has impeded more robust debates on the degree to which 
these titling schemes have led to truly meaningful outcomes for the rural poor. 
The onslaught of “global land grabbing”, a phenomenon defined as the 
“acquisition or long term lease of large areas of land by investors” (De 
Schutter, 2011: 249), rather than create space for the interrogation and 
investigation of the land titling agenda, has only given neo-liberal policy 
practitioners more leverage to push it with greater urgency.  
Concededly, titles are crucial in cases where the threat of physical 
dispossession is imminent. This would include for example, the farmers 
expelled in India’s Special Economic Zones (Levien, 2011) where the state 
expropriated untitled but occupied lands to meet the land-related needs of new 
investors, the rural settlers across Africa where the absence of formal de jure 
tenure has excluded them from consultations over large-scale land deals 
(Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010: 899);  even the urban dwellers of Boeung Kak, 
Cambodia, where an arbitrary denial of land title applications preceded 
expropriation (Bugalski and Pred, 2010). It would seem plausible in these clear-
cut dichotomies – title keeps you in, absence of title kicks you out -- that 
formal property rights provide at least some degree of protection.  
These black and white dichotomies however, obscure the many tones of 
gray in between.  
An underanalysed problem would be cases where the threat is not of 
physical expulsion from the land in the name of capital, but emanates from a 
complex web of market-driven pressures that increase vulnerability and 
compromise long-term well-being. These are cases where capital is backed, not 
by the iron fist of a dictatorial state, but by the soft economic blackmail of a 
cynical one. Whilst titles may appear to work against these cases of capital-
initiated, state-backed outright dispossession, casually applying that logic to the 
breadth and span of property regimes across the world may prove to be a little 
more tricky and dangerous. Under more complex landscapes, assertions in 
favour of land titling as automatic solutions must be carefully re-examined.  
Philip Hirsch in 2011 has problematised “the ways in which assertions are 
made on behalf of land titling, critiques are constructed against formalised title 
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in land, and debates are framed in the context of land grabbing (p. 1)” and 
surfaced the “set of conundrums” that underlie the processes of land grabbing 
and land titling through a bird’s eye view of land titling experiences in selected 
countries in South East Asia. Whilst intellectually rich and ideologically-
moored, the conversations on these processes may benefit from grounding in 
field-based evidence. 
This paper is an attempt to use empirical evidence to engage the analytical 
contours of the correspondence between formal property rights and land-
grabbing to which Hirsch and other scholars have contributed. Through the 
use of primary data obtained from an active bio-ethanol case study, I aim to 
critically interrogate the assertion that formal property rights in themselves 
insulate against the risks of land grabbing and the unstated implication that, 
when given to the rural poor in class-asymmetrical societies, have a 
“compensatory effect” that bridges power discrepancies and leads to 
favourable development outcomes. 
1.1 Research question 
The main research question that guides the empirical work in this paper is as 
follows: 
To what extent do formal property rights (i.e. land titles) determine and 
reconfigure development outcomes for small-holder farmers confronting the 
market-driven pressures of large-scale farmland investment or global land 
grabbing? 
1.2 Scope and limitations 
As already emphasised, the focus of this paper is agrarian settings where the 
threat emanates from a battery of market-driven pressures that create 
compulsions for farmers to incorporate into the value chain under prejudicial 
and exploitative terms. As such, I focus my research on the Philippines, a 
country whose farmers are no strangers to market-driven pressures (see for 
example, Borras, et al., 2000) and who, like many of its neighbours in Southeast 
Asia, as well as other countries in the Global South, has been at the receiving 
end of land titling programs imposed by neo-liberal institutions like the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank. 
These programs find ideological root in Hernando De Soto, who argued 
that the developing world has been left out of capitalism because of ineffective 
property regimes. The poor, De Soto claimed, “have houses but not titles, 
crops but not deeds, businesses but not statutes of incorporation.” (De Soto, 
2000:7). The titles given under the De Soto framework are normally blind to 
conflicting claims and have no redistributive or corrective agenda.  
However, titles have also been given to small-holder farmers under the 
more redistributive framework of agrarian reform which, in the Philippines, is 
embodied in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). This 
program became law in 1988 and was amended in 2008, with notable reforms. 
Titles under CARP are called Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOA). 
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Its immediate progenitor is the Emancipation Patent (EP), which was issued 
during the more limited agrarian reform program implemented by Ferdinand 
Marcos.  
My research subsumes both the De Soto conception and the redistributive 
CLOA/EP conception under the overarching concept of “formal property 
rights”.  
Whilst the land grabbing phenomenon can encompass fuel, food or feed 
production, the empirical data of offshore farmland investment in the 
Philippines appears to suggest that the primary purpose of the investment is 
bio-fuel production. As such, for context-driven reasons, this paper will be 
limited to that.  
Research for this paper was conducted during the period of June-August 
2011. It is important to qualify that since the project is only at its preliminary 
phase, findings and conclusions made do not attempt to make predictions 
about how the project will turn out and the welfare impacts of the project in its 
later stages. 
1.3 Methodology 
My methodology involves a case study analysis of an area in the northern part 
of the Philippines, where 15,000 has. of sugarclane lands are targeted for bio-
ethanol production. This selection is informed by the five criteria for case 
selection suggested by Smelser (1976: 4)  as quoted by de lla Porta (2008: 198) 
to wit: “(1) appropriate to the kind of theoretical posed by the investigator… 
(2) relevant to the phenomenon being studied… (3) empirically invariant with 
respect to their classificatory criterion… (4) reflect the degree of availability of 
data referring to this unit… and (5) decisions to select and classify units of 
analysis should be based on standardised and repeatable procedures. 
Isabela Province in the Philippines is an interesting study not only because 
it is poised to be the biggest bio-ethanol feedstock site in the Philippines but 
also because the landholding to be developed is occupied by farmers under 
various tenurial arrangements. Specifically, the landholding has groups of 
farmers with titles (CLOA, EP) and groups of farmers that do not have titles. 
These two groups shall compose my research sets. 
The purpose of the case study analysis therefore, is to examine how the 
introduction of the new variable -- in this case the overseas investment for bio-
fuel production—impact on the two groups. That the two groups are in the 
same landholding reduces the variance in factors such as topography, crop 
choice, susceptibility to climate change, and land valuation. 
This however is not to suggest that this paper is to undertake a “variable-
oriented” research rather than a “case oriented” research. While some 
comparisons will be made between the farmers with titles and the farmers 
without the titles, crucial to this research is looking at the case as an analytical 
whole—indeed, also asking why some farmers have titles and some do not, 
and what are the differentiations and processes within the landholding, what 
are the embedded relationships among and within groups.  
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My research methods shall be interviews, documentary analysis and 
observation. 
1.4 Organization of the paper 
The main body of this paper will take on three parts. Firstly, I provide a 
context and overview of the Philippine regulatory framework and land policy. I 
examine how rules and policies relating to land investment and land tenure are 
mediated by state actors in the national and local level and explore the extent 
to which security of tenure (attended by effective control and supervision of 
the landholding) of small farmers is protected under a policy structure designed 
to protect the market.  
Secondly, I compare two groups of farmers with lands leased to a bio-
ethanol plant in the Philippines for the preliminary phase of bio-ethanol 
production, and prove that there is no demonstrable evidence at present to 
support the conclusion that farmers with titles enjoy more protections and 
reap more benefits. I argue that the empirical evidence refutes the contention 
that land titling mitigates the risks of land grabbing and that providing land 
titles to farmers automatically lead to more beneficial outcomes. 
Thirdly, I explore the notion of titling as a conduit to capital, grounding 
my analysis in the strategic value of small-holder title to the seamless operation 
of the market, as demonstrated by empirical evidence in my field study. I argue 
that the asymmetries in relations between lessor farmers and lessee 
corporations create defective market conditions that imperil the former. 
Against this backdrop, land titling may exacerbate rather than cures inequality 
and marginalisation. 
2   Theoretical framework 
The orthodox neo-liberal formulation claims that overseas investment in 
farmland can yield benefits and provide opportunities to alleviate rural 
property—indeed, a rising tide raises all ships. Within that school of thought is 
the new institutional economics framework, rejecting the purism of neo-
classical thought but retaining its investment-centric paradigm. Proponents 
hold that for as long as an enabling legal framework is in place to ensure that 
the risks are adequately contained and managed, there is much to be gained 
and little to be feared. The Principles for Responsible Agro-Investment (RAI 
Principles, hereinafter) laid down by the World Bank (2010: x) leads this 
narrative. An essential part of this legal framework is the existence of clear and 
formal property rights. 
The United Nations, through the Commission on the Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP), has long thrown its explicit support 
behind formal property rights as an indispensable principle of poverty 
alleviation and tenure security. To quote: 
In economic terms, to be fully productive, assets need to be formally recognized 
by a legal property rights system. Embodying them in standard records, titles and 
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contracts in accordance to the law, gives households and businesses secure 
tenure that protects them from involuntary removal. 
To a certain extent, there is persuasive value to this statement because title 
does compel a buyer or a leasee to transact with the owner and thus can 
provide an extra layer of protection against evictions. But the CLEP goes 
further and argues that titling invigorates property and credit markets in a 
manner that serves the interests of the poor. It argues that a “comprehensive 
and functional property and business system allows land, houses, moveable 
property, equity shares and ideas to be transformed into assets that can be 
leveraged, bought and sold, at rates determined by market forces in a 
transferable and accountable way.” (ibid, at page 67.) 
Bundling together both the support for “responsible farmland 
investment” and for formal property rights, what we get is a policy prescription 
for the distribution of land titles to rural communities targeted for large-scale 
transnational investment. By virtue of these formal property rights, farmers can 
allegedly reap the purported benefits of the investments and positive outcomes 
can be had by all the stakeholders. Land titling facilitates the transactional 
potential of land in the market in order to produce capital, which will then lead 
to Western-style poverty alleviation, if not prosperity.  It would be, as the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (2009) puts it: a “win-win” scenario. The 
unstated conclusion is that it would have the effect of making up for the 
discrepancies in asymmetrical  relationships by giving the farmers more 
leverage for negotiations.  
To illustrate with a very simple equation, if the orthodox formulation is 
correct, 
low property rights  high risks under land grabbing 
ergo: 
high property rights  low risks under land grabbing 
If this simple equation were true, then the following suppositions are 
likewise true: 
1. The differential in property rights results in different outcomes for small-
holder farmers similarly exposed to land grabbing.  
2. Farmers with titles are less exposed to the risks of land grabbing and may 
even benefit from the same; 
3. Farmers without titles are more exposed to the risks of land grabbing and 
do not benefit from the same.  
4. Land grabbers prefer vast swathes of untitled lands over titled lands 
because the former is easier to wrest away than the latter. 
Likewise, if the equation was corroborated by empirical evidence, then it 
renders legitimate the massive land titling projects prescribed and embarked 
upon by organizations such as the World Bank and the Asian Development 
Bank, and frames the problematic to be about improving the titling system by 
expanding coverage, ensuring participatory processes, integrating “good 
governance” strategies. More importantly, it also renders legitimate the land 
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grabbing project itself – because if the risks can be effectively mitigated and the 
gains achievable, then resistance to it is invalid. 
2.1 Political economy approach as theoretical framework 
In investigating the orthodox formulation discussed above, this paper draws 
heavily from the Agrarian Political Economy approach that questions the 
reliance on the sterile, perfect logic of the market in chief by arguing that the 
formulation thus proffered ignores the class fault lines that underlie agrarian 
relations and systematically obscure that power asymmetries that affect 
capacities to transact and negotiate. Bernstein (2010) reminds us of the four 
key questions of political economy: “Who owns what? Who does what? Who 
gets what? What do they do with it?” (page 22). Bernstein explains further: 
These four key questions can be usefully applied across different sites and scales 
of economic activity, from households to “communities” to regional, national 
and global economic formations. They can also be applied to different types of 
societies at different historical moments. There is also an implicit sequence in the 
four questions: social relations of property shape social divisions of labour, which 
shape social distributions of income, which in turn shape the uses of the social 
product for consumption and reproduction – which, in the case of capitalism, 
includes accumulation. 
The heterodox narrative that undergirds agrarian political economy traces 
itself to the long-standing debates on capitalism and market efficiency. In 
diametric opposition to de Soto’s claim that it was the birth of capitalism (and 
the ability to produce capital) that was the turning point in the West and what 
freed its people from poverty, heterodox scholars such as Ellen Meiksins 
Wood paints a grim picture of the beginnings of formal property rights and 
privatization, tracing it to 16th century rural England where “enclosure” meant 
“the extinction (with or without a physical fencing of land) of common and 
customary use rights on which many people depended for livelihood”. (2002:8) 
And while the orthodox/World Bank frame traces the roots of poverty to 
the existence of barriers to the market exchange of land and resources, the 
counter-frame questions the logic of this commodification and exposes the 
flaws of an unfettered market exchange. Karl Polanyi has famously stated that 
“(t)o allow the market mechanism to be the sole director of the fate of human 
beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of 
purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society… Nature would be 
reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, 
military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials 
destroyed.” (1944: 73). 
The dominant paradigm’s agnosticism to issues of class stratifications 
becomes even clearer when we see how there is an apparent conflation 
between securing the rights of the rural poor to land and granting titles to 
them, suggesting as it were that the mere expedient of registering land in their 
names activates the breadth of rights to which they are entitled and therefore 
provides irrefutable benefits. Dekker (2003: 83), for example, has stated that 
“property rights that provide longer-term security will increase the demand for 
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long-term investment and thereby establish the basis for an increase in farmers’ 
assets”, and then he proceeds to argue for land titling and property registration.  
Deep suspicions on these formulations surface, when analysed from an 
agrarian political economy perspective. This lens of analysis looks at how the 
organized forces of capital operate to create a complex hybrid of pressures 
designed to conscript rural communities into serving its interests. Akram Lodhi 
introduces us to the concept of “neo-liberal enclosures”. To quote: 
Neoliberal enclosure can be differentiated from previous enclosures in that its 
objective is not to establish capitalist social property relations but rather to 
deepen the already prevailing set of capitalist social property relations by 
diminishing the relative power of peasants and workers in favour of dominant 
classes. This is achieved principally through the use of market-based processes 
supplemented by the direct action of the State. (2007: 1437). 
The process of neo-liberal enclosure is characterized by the creation of  
“bifurcated structures” (ibid) – two different productive sub-sectors existing 
side by side, with the former driven by the need to maximise competitive 
profitability “within an increased globalised circuit of capital” (ibid), producing 
for markets “primarily but not exclusively located in the North (ibid,), and the 
latter subsector whose terms of incorporation are dependent on labour-power 
provided, and whose linkage into the logic of the market is heavily regulated by 
the dominant class (ibid). Here, it is not difficult to see that the first sub-sector 
might be the corporation, whilst the latter subsector might be the peasant 
farmers and farm workers, conscripted to offer their labour power at 
prejudicial terms. Against this backdrop and using a lens of analysis that 
highlights rather than downplays these asymmetries, we now come to our core 
problematic: do land titles neutralize these asymmetries and grant leverage to 
the farmers, as the orthodox formulation suggests, or are there processes and 
politics that come into play and complicate the correspondence, such that 
“legal security of tenure” does not always lead to “economic security of 
tenure” (Hirsch, 2011: 8)? 
2.2 Adverse incorporation as analytic lens 
It now therefore begs the question: how then is economic security to be 
measured? Through what analytic lens do we measure whether or not land 
titling has enhanced or compromised economic security? 
This paper will use the lens of adverse incorporation to investigate the 
proposition that land titling can mitigate the risks that visit small-holder 
farmers as a result of large-scale farmland investment. The adverse 
incorporation discourse is central to this paper because the orthodox argument 
is in fact that land titling is a solution to exclusion, and is a means by which the 
poor can be included in global economic activity, and thus benefit from such 
inclusion. It is precisely this logic that pervades the dominant discourse of 
global land grabbing and informs policy responses of institutions like the 
World Bank and the organizations that support it.  
 This logic presupposes that it is the exclusion from the market that has 
created current conditions of inequality—reminiscent of the “social exclusion” 
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discourse that has undergirded poverty debates (see for example, de Haan, 
1999), and that has provided a framework upon which to understand the 
multidimensional aspects of deprivation. Critiques against this framework, 
however, argued that the popularity of the social exclusion discourse “was 
immediately conducive to legitimizing an approach to poverty based on the 
extension of market forces.” (Phillips, 2011: 390).  The critique gave rise to the 
notion of adverse incorporation, which proposes that it is not the exclusion, 
but rather the terms upon which peoples and groups are incorporated into the 
market that gives rise to conditions of poverty and vulnerability. Quoting 
Hickey and du Toit (2007: 4), the concept of adverse incorporation “captures 
the ways in which localised livelihood strategies are enabled and constrained by 
economic, social and political  relations over both time and space, in that they 
operate over lengthy periods and within cycles, and at multiple spatial levels, 
from local to global.” This is further understood by looking at the differences 
between the “relational” and “residual” nations of poverty, as usefully 
explained by Hickey and du Toit (2007: 5): 
The residual approach views poverty as a consequence of being left out of 
development processes, and contains the assumption that development brings 
growth and that what is required is to integrate people into markets. Relational  
approaches emphasise the extent to which ‘development’, growth and the 
workings of markets can also produce poverty. 
Emergent literature on land grabbing has begun to discuss adverse 
incorporation as a consequence of land grabbing, and not just the markedly 
more dramatic cases of dispossession and dislocation. John McCarthy, for 
example, looked with particularity on oil palm driven economic development 
in Indonesia, arguing that “individuals who find themselves incorporated into 
oil palm under unfavorable conditions will not only remain poor but may even 
face deeper poverty.” (2010: 826).  
 By what standards then can one determine that incorporation has been 
adverse? We find useful a definition given by Geoff Wood (2000: 19) who 
states that adverse incorporation refers to situations wherein: 
“In contexts of highly imperfect markets, corrupt state practices, and patriarchal 
norms, poor people (especially women and children) face a problematic search 
for security in income flows and stable access to stocks and services. They are 
obliged to manage this vulnerability through investing in and maintaining forms 
of social capital which produce desirable short-term,  immediate outcomes and 
practical needs while postponing and putting at permanent risk more desirable 
forms of social capital which offer the strategic prospect of supporting needs and 
maintaining rights in the longer term” (Wood, 2000: 18-19). 
Central to the definition posited by Wood is the notion of sacrificing long-
term, strategic, sustainable outcomes for stop-gap alleviation of immediate 
infirmities. What are these long-term outcomes possibly sacrificed under 
adverse incorporation? The most obvious would be effective control over 
assets.  
 One of these assets is labour. According to Phillips (2011: 392), 
systematic violations of workers’ rights leads to “the loss of control and 
heightened vulnerability that defines adverse incorporation.” Phillips proceeds 
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to explain that “the vulnerability associated with this loss of control can work 
to the advantage of capital in its creation and/or appropriation of a large pool 
of surplus, often informal and easily exploited labour, and the terms of 
incorporation into these labour markets in turn reinforce the loss of control 
that defines patterns of chronic poverty.” (ibid.)  
 For the rural poor, an important asset is land, and loss of control may 
be contemplated in two ways: firstly, loss of control over the terms of transfer 
of the land itself—i.e., terms of sale, terms of lease rental, if manifestly 
prejudicial to the seller or lessor as determined by fair market values; secondly, 
loss of control over cultivation and management of the landholding, where 
such loss was not contemplated  and consent to it not freely given, or was the 
result of a complex combination of social, economic and political pressures 
bearing down upon only one group. In addition, it is likewise posited that 
adverse incorporation is premised on asymmetrical relations, hence, 
asymmetrical or uneven relations must attend the loss of effective control of 
assets for a case of adverse incorporation to be made. This entails looking at 
discrepancies in bargaining power, economic standing, social and political 
influence, and the like. In research set in an agrarian-based setting, the 
asymmetrical relations between the lessee corporation and the small-holder 
farmers perhaps requires no further elaboration. 
2.3 Land titling and land grabbing: emergent conversations 
on a complex nexus 
Tentative reflections on land titling in the context of land grabbing  have 
already surfaced suspicions on the capacity of land titling to mitigate the risks 
of land grabbing. Cotula and Vermeulen (2010: 912-913), writing in the context 
of Africa, concede that improved land rights (land titles), even when 
“combined with enhanced ability to exert these rights” are necessary but not 
sufficient to protect the rights of farmers against the onslaught of corporate 
aggression and help them maximise the benefits of investment. Cotula likewise 
concedes that “the balance of power is skewed strongly towards the investor, 
particularly in the case of foreign investors with access to international legal 
advice and arbitration mechanisms” (913) and proposed more inclusive 
consultation processes that widens political spaces for the rural poor. The 
article, however, stops short of questioning the entire paradigm of land 
grabbing and is agnostic to the complicity of land titling in the exploitative 
tendencies of long-term farmland acquisitions. 
Borras and Franco, critically appraising this “necessary but not sufficient” 
framing of the problematic, underscored that not only should formal property 
rights be accompanied by genuine consultation processes, tendencies to slap it 
on as an automatic – if not complete – solution, should be checked. According 
to them, an “inductive approach is needed that is based on a deep 
understanding of the societies where intervention is targeted and makes socially 
legitimate occupation and use rights, as they are currently held and practiced, 
the point of departure for both their recognition in law and for the design of 
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institutional frameworks for mediating competing claims and administering 
land.”  (2010: 518). 
Indeed, without this deep understanding, disputes that arose out of these 
tensions had been attempted to be solved in ways that locals felt “undermined 
the existing social systems in place for resolving such disputes”. (Hutchinson, 
2008: 336). This, of course, is not a new concept. It was James Scott who first 
introduced the notion of “legibility”— the practice of statecraft that reduces to 
“legible” form (1998:33) customary practices and customary tenure, such 
legibility imposing upon and obscuring the complex cultural permutations and 
relations that animate local life and structures. The tensions that arise out of 
this imposition are multiple and difficult to ignore. At the heart of the 
dissonance is the perception of locals that “titling schemes in a number of 
instances amount to a privatization of what were previously communal lands, 
on which groups relying for their livelihoods on the commons – pastoralists, 
fishers or indigenous peoples depending on access to the forests for hunting 
and gathering purposes—depend.” (De Schutter, 2011: 269). In the end, it 
compromises “the wider social-political relations and cultural meanings that 
inhabit land, shaping individual and group claims to it in the real world.” 
Franco, et al. (2010: 674) 
Whilst these are recurring themes that reflect capitalism’s most 
bothersome anomalies, the onset of global land grabbing has given new 
complexion to these issues because of the intensified assault on farmland by 
market imperatives. In the current scan of the literature on land grabbing, 
dispossession still remains a prominent theme. Richardson (2011: 934) 
examined how the rhetoric of ethanol failed to deliver the goods for Zambia 
and argued that a rural development framework that does not explicitly target 
the rural poor can only lead to further dispossession. Mishra (2011: 12) 
challenges the “dispossession for development” paradigm that characterizes 
the poverty-stricken village of Orissa, India—demonstrating how this has led 
to “violent disruptions of livelihoods” and the forcible separation of producers 
from the means of their production. Ojeda points out an interesting emerging 
phenomenon: the “greening” of land grabbing (2011: 1), wherein ecotourism is 
a driver of dispossession, resulting in the massive number of Colombian 
campesinos expelled out of traditional indigenous territories to make way for a 
National Park. In most, if not all of these cases, the state played a coercive role 
in the dispossession, using the breadth of its powers to exact acquiescence. 
Less discussed is global land grabbing in another sense of the word 
“grab”—there is no physical grabbing or dispossession, but rather, what takes 
place is what I call a constructive expulsion as a result of adverse incorporation. 
They are expelled from the welfare-enhancing features of asset ownership 
because of prejudicial integration into the value chain, or adverse incorporation 
as previously discussed. An important contribution that looks at land grabbing 
from an adverse incorporation point of view is the work of Tanya Li (2011).  
Li looked at the nexus between land grabbing and labour, providing a scathing 
critique of the World Bank’s fixation with the notion that land grabbing 
provides gainful employment to the local population because it integrates them 
into the labour market, where otherwise they would not have been able to 
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integrate. She says that “in most cases, land acquisition takes the form of an 
investment by a corporate actor bearing capital and seeking profit. Such an 
investor operates in a competitive context that compels it to seek maximum 
profit on the capital it deploys…. Production might succeed, but poverty 
reduction through employment or compensation for land is not an investor’s 
concern.” (282-283).  
 But perhaps the most pointed engagement of the themes of land titling 
and land grabbing, which is hinged on similar doubts as Li on the capacity of 
market forces to produce equitable outcomes, comes from Hirsch (2011: 15): 
The conundrum is that, while most farmers and other landholders are pleased to 
obtain formal title over plots of land that they hold individually under more 
weakly demarcated and state-recognised arrangements, the process of land titling 
in some areas can weaken security in others and can entrench, sharpen and 
exacerbate existing inequalities in access to land. 
This paper pursues this trajectory and situates itself in the conversations 
by offering empirical evidence to aid in the understanding of land titling vis a 
vis land grabbing. 
2.4 Current conversations within the case study context: 
land titling, land grabbing, adverse incorporation in the 
Philippines 
The literature on Philippine land policy in general—the contextual backdrop 
on which we examine the relationship between land titling and land grabbing is 
analytically rich and insightful. Tracing it historically would show the uneven 
development of capitalism in the agriculture sector (Borras, 2007: 83) and the 
“complex agrarian structure” that it has created. Acute inequality (see for 
example, Putzel, 1992) and rural poverty have long been givens in this 
developing economy, but so has land-based wealth amongst the political elite 
and policymakers—rendering land policy at any given conjuncture always a 
contentious issue. Demands to correct skewed land ownership emanating from 
below did not result in immediate, decisive reforms. The struggle for 
redistribution was—and continues to be—a long protracted process, where 
contestations have to be made at every turn (see for example, Kerkvliet, 1990).  
State action is not a fossilized ‘done deal’, but rather, to borrow from Fox 
(1993), outcomes of “the interaction between state and society, the institutions 
that mediate such interaction, and the factors that account for how those 
institutions are in turn transformed”. Franco’s  (2005) observation likewise 
provides a helpful peg: 
Making law is not a uniform process spread evenly across national territories, but 
rather one that varies over time and space. What kind of law is authoritative in a 
given space and time is contingent upon ‘the interactions between actors in 
society and the state over the setting, interpreting, and complying with 
authoritative rules’ (Houtzager and Franco 2003). To the extent that the 
interactions vary, so does societally authoritative law (5). 
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The land titling paradigm is an outcome of these interactions, and its 
various corners are reflective of the variances in such. The distribution of titles 
to small-holder farmers as a consequence of redistribution can be said to be a 
product of mass movement struggles; the bias towards using these titles 
towards market integration, the product of a pervasive neo-liberal framework 
dominant in the state bureaucracy. At present, there has yet to be any explicit 
analysis of Philippine land titling and land registration schemes in the context 
of the new phenomenon of land grabbing. Among scholars, policymakers and 
peasant workers focused on the Philippines, a more common debate is 
emerging between those who advocate facilitating greater market integration 
for small farmers and those suspicious of such market-led interventions. Those 
espousing greater market integration emphasize belief in and support for small 
family farmers, while at the same time promoting market incorporation for 
them. According to Rene Ofreneo (2008), the two main priorities are: “(first), 
how to transform the ARBs and small farmers into modern agribusiness 
farmers and leaders of an agribusiness revolution in the Philippines, (and 
second), how to develop value-adding and beneficial linkages between the 
ARBs/small farmers and the agri-processing corporations.” There are 
cleavages even among the market incorporation supporters. Neo-classical 
purists advocate wide-open markets, under the theory that in one way or 
another, unqualified support for investment will redound to the benefit of the 
rural poor. Increasingly, policy makers in government populate this school of 
thought. Then there are those that support market integration, but stop short 
of advocating the lifting of restrictions on land transfers of redistributed land, 
fearing a re/consolidation of land in the hands on corporate interests or the 
landed elite.  Many non-government organizations congregate around this 
formulation.  
Counterpoised to these viewpoints are scholars whose suspicions on the 
viability of integration into the market are in truth questions about the 
fundamental assumptions of neo-classical economic theory. We look for 
example at  Borras’ critique: 
…the opportunities-centred arguments are founded on assumptions about the 
workings of the forces of the “free market”: vibrant land markets, free trade, 
perfect market information and perfect competition, a level playing field and the 
like. On most occasions and in most developing countries, contrary to textbook 
predictions, these conditions are not present… (2007: 63). 
Of more recent vintage are land grabbing discourses context-set in the 
Philippines— at present a small collection. Some themes have emerged, adding 
the Philippine narrative to the global spread of land grabbing narratives. 
Borras, Franco, Carranza and Alano (2011)  have surfaced the myth of 
“marginal lands”—wherein lands have been denominated as marginal to 
expedite acquisition, despite clear evidence of prior rights and productivity. 
Another emerging theme is the politics and dynamics in agrarian communities 
targeted for investment as well as the ambivalent responses of small-farmers— 
an angle explored by Salerno (2011) in her paper investigating farm investment 
in the Philippine South. Finally, Franco, Carranza and Fernandez (2011) 
recently published a paper on the Isabela case, focusing mainly on community 
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impacts and flagging the dangers wrought on local peoples by the coercive 
combination of authoritarian local politics and “corporate-controlled industrial 
agriculture” aggressively pushing the bio-ethanol project. 
3   An overview of  the policy context 
This chapter provides an overview of the policy context and the research 
area—describing the Philippines and its land titling system, its policy regime on 
land investment, and the case study itself: the bio-ethanol project in Isabela. It 
proceeds from the theory that investigating the correspondence between land 
titling and large-scale farmland investment cannot be done in a vacuum: it 
must take into account the contextual backdrop on which it is foisted and the 
politics and processes that are implicated when policy directions are set and 
implemented. By public policy, I adopt the definition of Grindle (1980: 5), who 
sees it as an “ongoing process of decision making by a variety of actors, the 
ultimate outcome of which is determined by the content of the program being 
pursued and by the interaction of the decision makers within a given political 
administrative context.” Houtzager and Franco (2003) further provide a useful 
handle when they stated that land laws and land policies “are neither self-
implementing nor self-interpreting”, but are outcomes of and shaped by 
interactions and frictions among different actors, at specific junctures. 
3.1 The constitution Giveth, the market Taketh away:  the 
schizophrenia of Philippine land policy 
To understand the dynamics of land titling and land grabbing in the 
Philippines, it is important to first understand that Philippine land policy is a 
schizophrenic animal. On the one hand, its main and official vehicle for 
smallholder title generation is the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program 
or CARP (main and official, because this is the vehicle that appears in the 
Constitution and enshrined as official state policy) an agrarian reform program 
that manifests an explicit bias for marginal farmers and contemplates a transfer 
of “effective control” (Borras and Franco, 2008: 2) of land resources from the 
dominant classes to the working people. On the other hand, surrounding this 
averred ‘official state policy’ is an almost air-tight policy regime characterized 
by (1) a central belief in the inerrant logic of the market, (2) an aversion to 
State interference, except when its coercive power is necessary to set up the 
legal structures that will allow the unimpeded movement of capital, (3) a 
depoliticised approach, where power and class are expunged from the 
equation. 
We begin by looking at CARP as the official policy for small-holder title 
distribution. A provision in the Philippine Constitution of 1987 expressly 
reads: 
Article XIII. Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform 
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are 
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other 
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State 
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shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, 
subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may 
prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity 
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining 
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State 
shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. 
It was in line with the mandate of the Philippine Constitution that the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law was passed in 1988, after the bloodless 
revolution of 1986 that topped a dictator and presented fresh opportunities for 
democracy and human rights. In 2008, funding for land acquisition and 
distribution was set to expire, and while the original Comprehensive Agrarian 
Reform Law did not come with an expiration date, termination of funding to 
compensate landowners effectively meant that no new acquisitions could be 
made. The balance of undistributed landholdings—1.3 million hectares, in 
total—presented a serious problem, especially when many of these 
landholdings were in agrarian hotspots and distribution was stymied because of 
fierce landowner resistance. 
After a contentious legislative process, R.A. 9700 was signed into law by 
then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. It gave agrarian reform fresh funding 
for a new five-year term, extended the mandate for acquisition and 
distribution, and incorporated a panoply of reforms, including the 
indefeasibility of the Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (also known as 
CLOAs or land titles given under to agrarian reform beneficiaries), the 
elimination of the Voluntary Land Transfer method, which has often been 
used by landowners to retain ownership of the land via dummy beneficiaries, 
the granting of usufructuary rights to potential farmer-beneficiaries, as well as 
gender-related provisions that recognize the rights of female farmers. Despite 
the bureaucratic weaknesses that plague its implementation and despite (or 
perhaps because of) the structural difficulties of land redistribution in a system 
with entrenched elite interests, CARP is still widely considered to be a social 
justice legislation and the primary vehicle for title generation for the rural poor.  
The schizophrenia becomes apparent when one examines the web of 
policies and regulations that surround this central policy and the various 
dissonances and contradictions embedded within it.  
Under the current policy paradigm in the Philippines, adherence to the 
dominant neo-liberal frame has unequivocally produced a network of 
regulations with a pro-market bias, reducing the social justice invocations of 
agrarian reform to becoming the proverbial “elephant in the room”. Consistent 
with the neo-liberal strategy to cut down spending and push for greater 
liberalization and privatization, the Philippines has embarked on an 
investment-hungry blitzkrieg. With agricultural land being the current 
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investment target of choice, like its neighbours in Southeast Asia1, the country 
has amended its existing laws and created new ones in order to further entice 
new investment to come in.  
 Perhaps the clearest example of this is Joint Administrative Order No. 
2008-1, Series of 2008—or the Guidelines Governing the Bio-fuel Feedstocks 
Production and Bio-fuels and Bio-fuel Blends Production, Distribution and 
Sale under RA 9367—which was enacted by the Departments of Energy, 
Agrarian Reform, Agriculture, Environment and Natural Resources, Finance, 
Labour and Employment, Science and Technology, Trade and Industry, 
Transportation and Communication, the National Commission on Indigenous 
Peoples, the Philippine Coconut Authority, the Sugar Regulatory 
Administration and the National Bio-fuels Board in support of the bio-fuel and 
bio-ethanol trend.  
Apart from expanding the scope of coverage of lands that may be 
converted2, JAO 2008-1 exempts from Department of Agriculture certification 
landowners whose “effective area is twenty five (25) hectares or less.” This 
means that all landowners with 25 hectares or less can arbitrarily and 
unilaterally decide to convert their landholdings to a bio-fuel production site.  
The DAR estimates that 1.3 hectares of land are undistributed. If these 
hectares of lands are made up of landholdings bigger than the retention limit of 
five hectares but less than 25 hectares, then they may immediately be 
converted into bio-fuel sites, no questions asked and no certification process 
required—presumably, even if the lands are tenanted.  
                                                
1 Lao PDR law of 2004  explicitly encourages foreign direct investment in its land and 
natural resources, including “(a)ctivities relating to agriculture or forestry, and 
agricultural, forestry and handicraft processing activities” as among its “promoted 
activities” in its Law on Foreign Investment (Article 16, Law on the Promotion of 
Foreign Investment). In December 2005, Cambodia passed a sub-decree to its Land 
Law of 2001, which would allow the state to issue Economic Land Concessions – 
defined as a “mechanism to grant private state land through a specific economic land 
concession contract to a concessionaire to use for agricultural and industrial-
agricultural exploitation” (Sub-Decree No. 46. Chapter 1, Article 1.) 
2 The Rules on Land Conversion  sets as non-negotiable for conversion all agricultural 
lands with irrigation facilities. This means that for as long as the land in question is 
agricultural in nature and has facilities for irrigation, its use should remain devoted to 
the planting of crops and may not be converted to any other use. However, Section 
4.1D of JAO 2008-1 does not include this exemption in its list of agricultural areas 
that shall not be utilized for bio-fuel feedstock production, and exempts practically 
only those lands where the irrigation facilities are government-funded, covered by 
irrigation projects with firm funding commitments and are utilized for rice and corn. 
Effectively, agricultural lands with irrigation facilities that do not fall under any of the 
categories mentioned above are fair game for bio-fuel production. Moreover, the Land 
Conversion Rules contains an entire category of lands highly-restricted from 
conversion such as lands with the potential of growing semi-temperate or high value 
crops, and irrigable lands not covered by irrigation projects with firm funding 
commitment. This category of highly-restricted lands is eliminated completely from 
JAO 2008-1. 
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The regulation effectively removes the protections afforded to tenants in 
the investment areas.  This includes the requirement for applicants to 
accomplish an affidavit stating the “number and names of the farmers, 
agricultural lessees, share tenants, farmworkers, actual tillers and/or 
occupants” in the landholding, and stating under oath that they have paid 
disturbance compensation to the farmers about to be dislocated. No such 
requirements are in the JAO 2008-1. It makes no mention of the safeguards to 
be afforded them, or the protections to which they are entitled3. It may also be 
noted that while a Land Use Conversion Certificate 4is required before the 
Department of Energy (DOE) issues a Certification of Registration with Notice to 
Proceed, such DOE certification is also not a precondition to be a Bio-fuels 
Livestock Producer so in fact, the Land Use Conversion Certificate has no 
material value. 
This aggressive promotion of bio-fuel investment through the relaxation 
of regulatory rules meant to protect farmers and land resources have raised 
alarm bells for activists, signifying a clear breaking point from the agrarian 
reform and social justice invocations reposed in State law. This becomes even 
more apparent when we look at the full throttle of administrative 
pronouncements, studies and reports churned out by the administrative 
agencies, revealing a vertical dissonance wherein administrative policies and 
practices conflict with the formal redistributive agenda reposed in official 
legislation  
In December of 2010, the Policy, Planning and External Affairs Office of 
the Department of Agrarian Reform released a document entitled “Bio-fuel 
Policy Studies: Simplification of Guidelines on Land Use Conversion for Bio-fuel Production 
and Agribusiness Ventures and Promoting Bio-fuel Investment in Agrarian Reform 
Communities in the Philippines.” This was a study funded by the Department of 
Energy. 
In its Background, the document stated: 
As the project title indicates, the first output on simplified guidelines on land use 
conversion for bio-fuel production is a timely and necessary response by the 
DOE to unfavourable feedbacks from bio-fuel investors on the currently lengthy 
and cumbersome procedures on land use reclassification and conversion. In 
order to create a conducive and facilitating application environment, it is 
imperative that the land use reclassification and conversion processes be 
simplified and enhanced to transform it into a customized and bio-fuel investor-
friendly tool. (2010: page 1, emphasis original) 
                                                
3 Admittedly, JAO 2008-1 adopts “in all aspect not inconsistent therewith” DAR AO 
1 Series of 2002, the regulation that carries these requirements; however, considering 
that compliance with the latter is not made a requirement in the application for bio-
fuel feedstock producer, agrarian reform lawyers say that the rights of the farmers in 
the area still remain precarious and vulnerable. 
4 A Land Use Conversion Certificate essentially states that a land can be more 
optimally used as an industrial or agro-industrial site rather than an agricultural or 
food production site. 
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The document is an example of what is beginning to be an explicit and 
unapologetic bias by government agencies towards investment: using the win-
win framework as rallying call and arguing that more investment automatically 
translates to an enhancement in the welfare of small farmers, but in truth, 
standing on the side of investment when it comes down to a choice between 
protecting small-holder farmers and protecting investment prospects.  
The document was in fact curiously silent on the issue of land rights and 
rural livelihoods—a marked departure from previous policy documents that at 
least paid lip service to the small-holder farmers. What makes it especially 
problematic in this case was that while the study was funded by the 
Department of Energy, the study was done wholly under the management and 
supervision of the Department of Agrarian Reform—the department with the 
primary mandate of securing and guaranteeing small-holder land rights. As one 
of the stated objectives of the project, it aims to “identify and examine the 
‘choke points’ which investors find cumbersome when applying for land use 
conversion for bio-fuel production purposes.” (ibid.) 
The formulation is interesting, because in fact one of the major 
“chokepoints” to land conversion is resistance from the ground, and the gamut 
of restrictions in existing law meant to protect the rights of small tillers in the 
lands sought to be converted.  In an interview with the DAR representative, he 
did identify one of the chokepoints as “noisy opposition from those who do 
not understand the issue.” This theme of “choke point to investors” is 
repeated many times over, by different policy actors at the national and local 
levels. In Isabela, this theme was particularly sharp. In an interview with Cora 
Pua, the community affairs officer of the Office of the Mayor, she stated: 
“People who complain do not know what they are talking about. If you want 
progress, you need to make sacrifices5,” 
There also appears to be a contradiction between the law and its 
implementation on the ground. In an interview with Gomer Tumbali6, the 
Deputy National Program Director and head of the Agribusiness 
Entrepreneurship Development Program of the DAR, he insisted that a check 
on possible abuses by the investor on the agrarian reform beneficiary  (ARB) is 
the rule that lease contracts need to be approved first by the DAR and hence, 
                                                
5 Personal Interview with Cora Pua on 12 July 2011 at the Office of the Municipal 
Mayor of San Mariano, Isabela (hereinafter, Pua interview) 
6 Personal Interview with Gomer Tumbali on 5 July 2011 at the Department of 
Agriculture National Office (hereinafter, Tumbali interview). 
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these contracts are reviewed for their legality and compliance with regulation7 
before the arrangement can proceed. 
An interview however with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer in 
Isabela, Virgilio Acasili8, yields the express concession that he has never seen a 
single lease contract between ECOFUEL and an agrarian reform beneficiary. 
When pressed to answer if there were lawyers working for the DAR or 
contracted by the DAR to review the lease contract as stipulated by the 
administrative order, he then candidly shares that he has a directive from the 
DAR Secretary himself, stating that he and his office may consult or discuss 
with business experts so that maximum economic efficiency is ensured, but 
“not with lawyers”.9 The important thing, he said, is that the investment 
follows through and the farmers benefit. This was a sentiment echoed by the 
other key informants. 
“When hired as farmworkers, at least they have money at the end of the day,” - 
Mariz Agbon10, head of the PADCC. 
 
“The social problems have decreased, because the farmers are now productive,” - 
Cora Pua11, Community Affairs Officer in Isabela. 
 
“At least, now they are being taught technical expertise,” – Virgilio Acasili12, 
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer. 
The above example demonstrates two things: first, the trivialisation of the 
regulatory process, and second, a naked belief that the benefits of increased 
investment will “trickle down” to the farmers and that welfare enhancement 
should be measured by comparing the situation now with what it was before, 
rather than what it should be under more equitable conditions. It is against this 
background that the relationship between land titles and land grabbing is to be 
examined. 
                                                
7 DAR Administrative Order No. 9 requires a lease contract between an ARB and an 
investor to contain the following minimum requirements:  “(a)  minimum amount 
rental – and the factors to arrive at that value;  (b) mandatory inputs from the 
investor, including an item on the investor’s assumption of the risk of loss of 
agricultural operations, to include crop failure due to natural calamities or force majeure 
(where the lessee—ARB is still assured of the payment of the lease rental);  (c) 
specifics of tax payments;  (d) priority to qualified and willing ARBs and their 
dependents for employment in the enterprise;  (d) interim nature of the lease 
agreement—i.e. that the same shall only be intended to enable the ARBs or their 
organization to develop skills necessary to assume general control and management of 
the farm.” 
8 Personal Inteview with PARO Virgilio Acasili, 15 July 2011, at DAR Provincial 
Office, Isabela (hereinafter Acasili interview). 
9 The author was furnished a copy of the document entitled “Highlights of Major 
Agreements and Directives, Isabela Province, 18 March 2010). 
10 Personal Interview with PADCC Chair Mariz Agbon, 5 July 2011 at the DA 
National Office (hereinafter Agbon interview). 
11 Pua interview. 
12 Acasili interview. 
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3.2 Overview of the project 
The bio-ethanol project in Isabela, described by the PADCC as the “only 
active bio-fuel case in the Philippines at present” (Agbon, Interview, 2011), 
involves the development of 11,000 has. of land in Isabela for the purpose of 
the cultivation of sugarcane that will in turn be used to produce 54 million 
liters of anhydrous ethanol per year. Isabela, a province located in the northern 
part of the Philippines, is the second largest rice production area in the 
Philippines, next to its neighbour province Nueva Ecija. The feedstock 
production sites are spread out over the municipalities of San Mariano, Benito 
Soliven, Naguilan, Ilagan, Camu and Cauayan City, while the site of the bio-
ethanol plant – under construction at the moment – shall be at San Mariano. 
Currently, 6,000 has. of the 11,000 has. has already been developed. 
Prior to the lease of the lands to ECOFUEL, farmers had been using the 
lands to plant a variety of crops for consumption and for sale. “An assortment 
of vegetables”, was how one of the farmers put it. According to the farmers, 
ome of these lands are planted with rice and corn, even though Provincial 
Agriculturist Virgilio Acasili13 strenuously insisted that rice and corn lands were 
off-limits to the project. Prior to the project, they were not receiving any 
subsidies from the government for food crop production. 
Engineer John Tampo14, the Vice President of ECOFUEL Land 
Development Inc. (hereafter, ECOFUEL) explained to me in an interview that 
the mother corporation is Green Future Innovations (hereafter, Green Future), 
a Japanese and Taiwanese owned company involved in bio-fuel protection. 
ECOFUEL on the other hand, is a 100% Philippine owned corporation that, 
by virtue of a feedstock supply agreement with Green Future, is tasked with 
land development and land preparation in order to supply the sugarcane 
needed for bio-ethanol production. ECOFUEL targets the hiring of more than 
2,000 farm workers to cultivate the feedstock production sites and 200 workers 
for the plant itself. 
In its brochure, ECOFUEL claims to offer two schemes to farmers interested in 
participating in the bio-ethanol project. The first is a land lease, described in its 
brochure as consisting of a – 
 
“Lease period of six (6) years at PhP3,000.00-PhP10,000.00 per hectare per year 
depending on distance, access road, soil fertility, water source and must be 
tractorable”. ECOFUEL will pay lump sum of three (3) years upon processing of 
the documents and a signing bonus of PhP500.00/ hectare, 
 
as well as Contract Growing Arrangement, described as follows: 
 
                                                
13 Acasili interview 
14 Personal Interview with Engineer John Tampo, Vice President of ECOFUEL, 13 
July 2011 at ECOFUEL Plant, Ilagan, Isabela. 
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“ECOFUEL will provide all inputs, farm labour from planting to harvesting and 
tractor services. There is no charge on the advances, just minimal service charges. 
The farmer contract grower will be trained on sugarcane farming for free and an 
ECOFUEL technician will assist the contract grower during the growing period. 
A signing bonus of PhP500.00/hectare will be given plus upfront of 
PhP10,000.00/ ha. (1000) upon signing/processing of documents, PhP 5,000.00 
upon planting and the PhP4,000.00 2 months after the planting) for areas within 
the 30-km radius from the plant site. 
To date, however, 90% of the participating farmers are still under land 
lease arrangement.  
The project gained the full support of the local government from its initial 
phases in 2009 with the Office of the Mayor of San Mariano bannering the 
project as the flagship project of his administration. In an interview Mayor 
Edgar Go15, he enumerates the benefits to the community as follows: 
“infrastructure development, livelihood, upliftment of living conditions, revenue 
generation for local government units for through tax collection, environmental 
protection.” 
The official policy statement of ECOFUEL, shared by the Office of the 
Mayor, is that the project only targets “idle lands, grass lands and marginal 
lands”—thus supposedly refuting allegations made by some quarters that bio-
ethanol production compromises rice production and food security. Provincial 
Agriculturist Danilo Tumanao16 describes sugarcane as an “upland crop” that 
does not require irrigation and will not compete with rice, which is a “lowland 
crop” that requires irrigation.  
Whilst emphasising that the project was initially conceptualised as one to 
be developed on unutilized/underutilized public lands of the sort described 
above, Tumanao17 concedes that at present, private lands are being used as well 
“upon the consent of the landowner” but disavows any knowledge of rice 
lands being used for bio-ethanol production.  
The table below describes the local actors and their roles in the bio-
ethanol project, as well as their relationships to each other: 
                                                
15 Phone interview with Mayor Edgar Go, 13 July 2011 (hereinafter, Go interview). 
16 Personal interview with Provincial Agriculturist Danilo Tumanao, 14 July 2011 at 
the Department of Agriculture Provincial Office (hereinafter, Tumanao interview). 
17 Ibid. 
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 Actors 
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4  Titled but not entitled: reexamining the welfare-
enhancing potential of  formal property rights 
Deininger has said: 
Where smallholders already cultivate land, large investments do not have to result 
in the conversion of small-scale agriculture to large-scale agriculture. To the 
contrary, institutional arrangements such as land rental and contract farming can 
help combine investors’ assets (capital, technology, markets) with those of local 
communities and small holders (land, labour and local knowledge). As long as 
property rights to land and, where necessary, water, are well-defined (not 
necessarily on an individualized basis) and a proper regulatory framework to 
prevent externalities is in place, productivity- and welfare-enhancing transactions 
can occur without the need for active intervention by the state... If rights are well 
defined, if land markets are not monopolized, and if information is accessible to 
all, voluntary transactions where land is valued at market prices should ensure 
that a mutually satisfying outcome is achieved. (2011: 235-236). 
This formulation begs the question:  how about in cases where titled lands 
are precisely the ones preferentially “grabbed” through one-sided lease 
arrangements, under terms prejudicial to the seller? Or cases where titled and 
non-titled lands are equally rendered vulnerable and there is no apparent 
differential in the vulnerabilities that attend exposure to the risks of overseas 
farmland investment? How are these permutations to be explained by the 
“unfaltering” logic of the free market and private property? How does the 
orthodox formulation deal with evidence of a less-than-perfect correspondence 
between land titling and land grabbing, given that it is this correspondence that 
is relied upon to legitimise the land grabbing project?  
We now look at the outcomes of the field research conducted in the bio-
ethanol plantation in Isabela where I conducted focus group discussions on 
two sets of farmers in Barangay Alibadabad—one group of farmers with titles 
(well-defined property rights) and another group of farmers without titles (ill-
defined property rights). Reference will also be made to a document entitled 
“Area Turnover Summary” in which ECOFUEL Land Development Inc. lists 
the names of the farmers who leased their lands for bio-ethanol production. 
 The first group (hereinafter, “titled group”) was composed of twelve 
(12) farmers, ten of whom hold Certificate of Land Ownership Awards 
(CLOA) in their own capacities, and two of whom were daughters of CLOA 
holders. The youngest respondent was 39 years old, the oldest was 71 years 
old. By circumstance and not by design, the group was divided equally between 
men and women. The sizes of the landholding range from 0.4 hectares to 2.5 
hectares. The turnover dates to ECOFUEL were all between the period of 
2009-2011. Prior to the lease, the landholding was devoted to the cultivation of 
palay/ rice or corn and vegetables. All were paid PhP5,000.00 (approximately 
82.03 EUR) per hectare per year. Their respective lease contracts stipulate a 
six-year-term, except for two respondents with a three-year term and a four-
year term in their lease contracts. In all cases, the respondents were paid 
upfront the total lease rental for the specified term (for example, the 
respondent with a six-year-term was paid PhP30,000.00, or 492.18 EUR). 
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Of the ten respondents in the group composed of non-title holders, seven 
were male and three were female. The youngest was 31 and the oldest was 58. 
The smallest size of the landholding was 0.6 has. And the largest was 9 has. 
They all leased their property to ECOFUEL between the periods of 2009-
2011. To evidence ownership or a claim of ownership that the corporation 
deemed sufficient to consider them a party to the lease agreement, six 
presented a tax declaration18, three presented a barangay certificate19 and one 
presented a certificate issued under the Socialized Industrial Forestry 
Management Program or SIFMA20. All but one of the respondents had granted 
lease terms of 5-6 years, with one respondent’s lease having only a three-year 
duration. 
Table 2 shows the basic data of the first group: 
TABLE 2 
 “Titled” respondents 
Respondents Basis of 
possession 
Land 
size 
(has.) 
Rate of 
rental 
(per has.  
per yr) 
Term 
of 
lease 
Location 
(aprox) 
Soil 
type 
HM. CLOA 0.8 5.000.00 6 
years 
500 m fr road Clay soil 
RA CLOA 1.2 5,000.00 6 
years 
500 m fr road Clay soil 
NG CLOA 2.4 5,000.00 5 
years 
500 m fr road Clay soil 
LB CLOA 3 5,000.00 6 
years 
400 m fr road Clay soil 
LBa CLOA 0.5 5,000.00 5 
years 
500 m fr road Clay soil 
SP CLOA 0.5 5,000.00 6 
years 
600 m fr road Clay soil 
RT CLOA 1.0 5,000.00 6 
years 
500 m fr road Clay soil 
MM CLOA 1.5 5,000.00 6 
years 
Away from 
road 
Clay soil 
                                                
18 A tax declaration certifies that the individual stated therein has paid real estate taxes 
for the property specified. The Philippine Supreme Court has had occasion to rule 
several times that while a tax declaration may serve as basis to infer possession, it is not a 
sufficient proof of ownership. 
19 A certification issued by the Barangay chairman (a barangay is the smallest unit of 
local government) certifying that the person named in the certificate is in possession 
of the specified landholding. It is not sufficient proof of ownership. 
20 A SIFMA is an agreement entered into between the Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources and an individual person whereby the former grants the latter 
rights to utilize and manage a small tract of forestland in a manner that will satisfy 
both the individual’s livelihood needs and the government’s sustainable development 
objectives. 
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Table 3 shows the basic data for the second group, the group without 
titles. 
TABLE 3 
 “Untitled” respondents 
Respondents Basis of 
possession 
Land 
size 
(has.) 
Rate of 
rental 
(per has. 
per yr) 
Term 
of 
lease 
Location Soil 
type 
RM Bgy. certificate 1.2 5.000.00 6 
years 
400 m fr 
road 
Clay soil 
RG Bgy. certificate 0.9 10,000.00 6 
years 
400 m fr 
road 
Clay soil 
SD Tax declaration 9.0 5,000.00 5 
years 
500 m fr 
road 
Clay soil 
DD Tax declaration 2.6 10,000.00 6 
years 
Along  road Clay soil 
RC Tax declaration 3.2 5,000.00 5 
years 
200 m fr 
road 
Silt loam 
SP Bgy. certificate 1.5 10,000.00 6 
years 
Along road Clay soil 
EB Tax declaration 5.9 10.000.00 3 
years 
Along road Clay soil 
MD SIFMA 1.3 10,000.00 6 
years 
Along road Clay soil 
MP Tax declaration 1.7 10,000.00 6 
years 
Along road Clay soil 
PA Tax declaration 0.6 5,000.00 6 
years 
500 m fr 
road 
Clay soil 
 
All of the respondents explained that they had been convinced to enter 
the project when representatives of the Department of Agriculture, 
representatives of the local government, as well as a representative of 
ECOFUEL gathered groups of farmers together to convince them to lease 
their lands the company. They were also told that they would be hired as 
farmworkers to do land preparation activities such as weeding, cutting of 
sugarcane, pesticide spraying and plowing. Ten out of twelve of the 
respondents currently work as farmworkers, the remaining two have daughters 
who are farmworkers.  
A perusal of the above data yields the following conclusions. 
4.1 No “premium” for title holders in terms of rate of lease 
rental 
As evidenced by a comparison of the tables, possession of titles is not made a 
basis for determining the rate of lease rental. In fact, none of the respondents 
in the first group were given a lease rental rate of more than PhP5,000.00, 
whilst in the second group six out ten were given PhP10,000.00, even if their 
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only proof of possession/ownership was a tax declaration, barangay certificate 
or  SIFMA. 
The tables also demonstrate that the primary basis used by the ECOFUEL 
in pegging the rate of lease rental is accessibility. All of the respondents who 
were paid PhP10,000.00 have landholdings located “along the road” whilst 
those who were paid PhP5,000.00 were farther away, and this is regardless of 
their claim of ownership. This was confirmed by ECOFUEL itself, through 
Engr. Tampo, who said in the interview that “if the landholding is far, I ask for 
a discount.21”  
Moreover, respondents from both groups felt that they were being 
shortchanged by the lease amount paid to them but could do nothing because 
it was better than not having money at all. To quote a respondent with a 
CLOA who was paid a lease rental rate of PhP5,000.00: 
Alam naming na malaki ang kita sa bio-ethanol pag binenta na sa ibang bansa. 
Milyon milyon daw, abot pa ng bilyon na dolyar. Hindi piso, dolyar. Parang butil 
butil lang bayad sa amin, pero sanay naman kami sa butil butil, kaysa wala. 
 
(We know that bio-ethanol rakes in big profits in the world market. Millions, if 
not billions of dollars. Not pesos, but dollars. We know that we are only paid 
crumbs, but then we are used to crumbs. It is better than nothing.) 
All of them had already spent or allocated the lease rentals paid to them. 
Majority said that they had used it to pay off loans from loan sharks. They 
relayed how loan sharks had descended on the area upon hearing news that 
there was new cash to be had. Instant demands were made on old debts, with 
penalties and interest charges. “Naamoy nila ang pera (they smelled the cash)”, 
one of them said wryly.  
A number said that the money went to non-farm activities such as paying 
the recruitment fee to send a member of the family overseas to work , some 
used it to buy a sewing machine and to set up a small tailoring business, yet 
others to make repairs on the house. 
4.2 No premium for title holders with respect to 
employment as farmworkers 
Regardless of land title status, they are all entitled to work as farm workers on 
the landholding, subject to their obtaining a “recommendation letter”22 from 
the Office of the Mayor of San Mariano. The non-CLOA respondents said 
they were convinced by the same groups that convinced the CLOA 
respondents to lease their lands to ECOFUEL. They said that they were 
immediately assured that a title was not necessary to enter into a lease contract, 
only that they would be able to prove their ownership or possession of the 
                                                
21 Tampo, interview 
22 In the interview with the Mayor, it was learned that the “recommendation letter” 
requirement is to implement the “San Mariano First policy”—a mechanism that 
ensures that San Mariano residents would be given priority in hiring. 
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land against other possible conflicting claims. They were assured that a title 
would not be used as the basis of determining lease rentals or of hiring as 
farmworkers. Indeed, the respondents were all hired by ECOFUEL under the 
same terms and arrangement as the CLOA group. 
The arrangement was described as follows: ECOFUEL would pay PhP 
1800.00 to PhP 2000.00 (approximately 30 EUR to 35 EUR) as labour fee for 
one hectare. Farmworkers would then group together to be able to finish the 
work. A group of fifteen farmworkers working from 6:00 am to 6:00 pm would 
normally be able to finish the weeding of one hectare of land in one day. They 
would then split the costs amongst themselves, thus earning for an individual 
farm worker the best possible rate of PhP133.33 (approximately 2.20 EUR) a 
day. Current minimum wage rates in Isabela (the minimum allowable amount 
to be paid by an employer to an employee without breaking Philippine law) as 
of February 16, 2011, according to the Department of Labour and 
Employment is PhP 233.0023.  
The respondents in the titled group say that they do not always get the 
PhP133.00 and on many days get less than PhP100.00.One female respondent 
in the first group whose son is a farm worker shares that there were days when 
her son received only PhP 23.00. The non-titled group likewise stated that 
there are days when they get less than PhP100.00 a day for weeding, cutting of 
sugarcane, pesticide spraying and plowing. More than half stated that even 
though this is small, this signifies a marked improvement in their livelihoods 
because they were accustomed to getting nothing in the past and receiving 
scant local government support. However, all expressed dissatisfaction over 
the wages being received.  
They also complained about the back-breaking work. According to one of 
the respondents in the second group: 
Para makakuha ka ng higit 100, kailangan mo magkayod-kalabaw. Magigising ka 
ng alas sais at dire-diretsong trabaho. Kailangan namin matapos para mas malaki 
ang kita.  (If you want to earn more than PhP100.00, you have to work like a 
carabao. You wake up at 6:00 am and do non-stop work. We have to finish it if 
we want to earn more.) 
ECOFUEL through Tampo admits that there are lapses with regard to 
wages and labour standards, but attributes this to its being a young company. 
“We admit there are lapses, we admit that there are problems with wages, but 
these are the birth pains of starting out. I will look into this.24” To date, 
however, there remains no marked improvement in the wages received by the 
farm workers, or the labour standards and policies. When interviewed, the 
Mayor stated that his office can only specify who to recommend for hiring, but 
it cannot interfere in the determination of the wages25. 
                                                
23 For agricultural workers. PhP 218.00 (basic wage) + PhP 15.00 (Cost of Living 
Allowance, under Wage Order No. RTWPB-II-10.) = PhP 233.00. For non-
agricultural workers, it is PhP 245.00. Source: National Wages and Productivity Commission, 
Department of Labour and Employment. 
24 Tampo, interview 
25 Go, interview 
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4.3 No difference in assessment of well-being improvement 
between the titled group and the non-titled group 
When asked whether or not there was an improvement in their lives as a result 
of the bio-ethanol project, all of them answered in the affirmative but said by 
way of qualification that this was because in the past, they were used to not 
getting anything at all. All of them—titled and untitled—had experienced 
hunger during the past five years. There were variances in the degree to which 
they felt their lives had improved. One respondent, a farm guard, expressed 
enthusiasm about the project and said that his life had improved “very much” 
(malaki ang ginhawa). This respondent had also been hired as a farm guard by 
the corporation, and was acting as an interim “supervisor” over the other farm 
workers. His landholding is untitled. He is the only one who can speak directly 
to the corporation and has access to the corporation’s offices in the province. 
It is interesting to compare this with the respondent who expressed the 
least enthusiasm about the project and expressed uncertainty about the long-
term sustainability of the project—“there was a small improvement, but I am 
not sure how long this will last”. She owns a CLOA and is the mother with the 
son who had experienced earning PhP23.00. 
Respondents in both groups noticed an improvement in infrastructure and 
believe this to be beneficial to the barangay in the long run. They also put 
stock in the commitment of the corporation to provide them with health and 
death benefits, although at the time of the interview, none of them had availed 
(or had cause to avail) of such benefits either for themselves or for next of kin.  
Most are optimistic about the presence of ECOFUEL in their community and 
the development prospects it will bring. Some reasons given are (1) they see 
the tremendous support of the local government as compared to when they 
were planting rice and corn, (2) they believe that ECOFUEL will increase their 
wages as soon as the plant becomes operational and profits come in for the 
corporation, and (3) they believe that ECOFUEL will bring in other investors 
to Isabela, which will increase development possibilities of the region.  
Four expressed a fear that they may never get control of their land back, 
interestingly three of those came from the titled group. When prodded to 
explain the basis of such fears considering that the transaction is only a lease 
agreement, they found it difficult to give concrete answers. One presents an 
interesting fear: he worries that there may be no more farmworkers for him to 
hire for his rice and corn lands (that were not leased to ECOFUEL) in the 
province because working in the bio-ethanol farms present more lucrative 
opportunities.  
In sum, however, it can be said that there is no marked disparity between 
the respondent group with secure titles and the respondent group without 
secure titles with respect to their perception of well-being improvement as a 
result of the bio-ethanol plant. 
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4.4 Synthesis of findings 
To summarise, findings from the field appear to suggest that there is no causal 
relation between secure property rights and increased well-being (and 
perception of well-being). In this case, there is equal exposure to the 
consequences of land grabbing and no marked disparity between groups with 
secure property rights and groups with no secure property rights in terms of 
rate of lease rental, likelihood of employment as farm workers, and perceptions 
of improvement in well-being. 
It is not difficult to see that the lease rental rate of PhP5,000.00 – 
PhP10,000.00 per has. per year is inequitable, and this rate is nothing if not the 
outcome of power asymmetries between the farmer and the corporation. It is 
well below the fair market value, and it is an unconscionable fractional 
percentage of the profits that ECOFUEL stands to gain from selling the bio-
ethanol in the world market. Likewise, it is not difficult to see that a daily wage  
of less than two euros, well below the regional minimum wage, is unfair as well 
as illegal. 
The findings tell us that contrary to the orthodox perception, secure 
property rights do not  necessarily provide a buffer against the inequities 
described above and do not lessen the vulnerabilities that farmers face as a 
result of the onslaught of commercial pressures on land. Capital will find a way 
to seek out and obtain lands that are “relevant” to its purposes—titled or 
untitled—and consequently, will ignore lands that are of no use to it—titled or 
untitled. A supposition is ventured that where relations between the parties are  
asymmetrical, the presence or absence of secure property rights held by the 
weaker party in the asymmetry can possibly alter the manner of obtaining, but 
it cannot—as a sole variable and with no other intervention—automatically 
buffer the consequences of the obtaining.  
5  Titling in the service of  capital 
The previous chapter has shown that  in Isabela there is no correspondence 
between secure property rights of small farmers and the degree to which they 
are exposed to the risks and vulnerabilities brought about by land grabbing. 
This chapter looks at how, in landscapes with stark asymmetrical faultlines, not 
only does land titling not buffer the consequences of land grabbing, it operates 
to create a complex hybrid of pressures designed to conscript rural 
communities into serving the interests of capital. 
5.1 Corporation-backed land titling 
With this framework of understanding, we proceed to look into the relations 
between ECOFUEL Corporation and the lessor farmers. Earlier in the paper, 
it was discussed that if the equation was correct (i.e., low property rights lead 
to higher exposure to land grabbing risks, high property rights lead to lower 
exposure to land grabbing risks), then corporate land grabbers would favour a 
situation wherein the lands targeted for investment have no titles and the 
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settlers have no formal claims. But what if the corporation itself is aggressively 
pushing for land titling? How is this phenomenon to be understood using a 
political economy framework? 
Indeed, a fascinating point that was raised in the discussion during the 
second FGD (non-holders of title) is that one of their primary motivations for 
leasing the land to ECOFUEL is because ECOFUEL has committed to assist 
them in securing their permanent titles to the property. When asked to 
describe the nature of ECOFUEL’s assistance in title generation, they 
answered that ECOFUEL provides free lawyers and private surveyors (“libreng 
paabugado, at libreng pasurvey”). This service is free for as long as one decides to 
lease his or her land to ECOFUEL. To quote one of the respondents: 
“Mapapadali na ang papasok ng lupa naming sa ECOFUEL at mapaparkila na 
namin ito, Pag walang sabit ang title, mas maayos ang relasyon naming sa kanila. 
(Giving us titles will make it easier for us to rent our lands to ECOFUEL. It will 
make our relationship with them easier.)” 
To provide perspective, the acceptance fee of a local lawyer in Isabela is 
somewhere around PhP10,000.00, a conservative amount that can go even 
higher depending on the experience and reputation of the lawyer and the 
degree of difficulty of the case. This does not include the payment for the work 
that comes after, like writing pleadings and filing documents. As the table in 
the prior chapter demonstrates, for some of the respondents, the amount of 
PhP10,000.00 is even higher than the lease rental of 1 hectare of land for one 
year.  
As one of the respondents put it, “ang ilan sa amin, hindi pa nakakakita ng 
abugado, tapos eto ang ECOFUEL, inalukan kami ng libreng abugadong tutulong sa 
amin. (many of us have not even seen a lawyer in real life, and then here comes 
ECOFUEL, offering free legal services just like that)”. When asked to give 
examples of the kinds of disputes for which legal services are provided, the 
farmers cite the example of boundary disputes and even family disputes where, 
for example, a conflict of claims arises between two heirs of the original land-
holder. “Kahit away pamilya pinapasok ng ECOFUEL, (even family feuds are not 
exempt from ECOFUEL’s intervention)”, says one of the respondents. 
This was confirmed by John Tampo himself, speaking for ECOFUEL. In 
a response written to address the contentions of an International Fact Finding 
Report, it was stated that: 
In cases where families lack documented proof of land ownership, ECOFUEL is 
in fact helping them in these documentation requirements, always careful that we 
are helping only those who have rightful claims to the land they own. 
In the interview, this was discussed in greater depth.  “We want to give 
them a stronger hold on their claims, because this helps the company as 
well26.” He confirms that legal services are indeed being provided, but nothing 
by way of full-blown litigation. Services often include notarization of 
                                                
26 Tampo, interview. 
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documents, legal consultation on technical points, as well as coordination with 
the Department of Agrarian Reform to expedite claims.  
In an interview, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), Virgilio 
Acasili, said that he sees nothing wrong with that. 
They (the corporation) help speed things up. Don’t we want farmers to own 
land? Of course, if ECOFUEL is pushing for the titling and they help make sure 
the farmers have the proper documents and have legal representation to address 
the bottlenecks, then the lands that ECOFUEL helps are more easily titled. Do 
we not want that?27 
5.2 Titling as “reward” for incorporation 
While seemingly innocuous, there are intrinsic and fundamental problems 
embedded within this framework of corporate-mediated and -assisted land 
titling generation. 
First, it incentivizes lease arrangements, and makes title security a 
“reward” for allowing one’s agricultural property to be the subject of a 
corporate lease; conversely it is a disincentive to owner-cultivation, control and 
management.  As one of the respondents put it: 
Para magkaroon kami ng titulo sa lupa na maipapamana naming sa aming mga 
anak, ipapaupa na muna namin yung lupa sa ECOFUEL. (So we can make sure 
that we have titles to pass on to our children, we will first lease our lands to 
ECOFUEL). 
This effectively reworks the entire policy paradigm of agrarian reform in 
the Philippines—a policy paradigm that puts primacy on effective control and 
management by the agrarian reform beneficiary of his or her landholding and 
therefore considers lease arrangements to be a “last resort”.28 The rationale of 
agrarian reform is to free farmers from the yoke of tenancy that attaches him 
or her to the landowner and to allow a full exercise of agency to correct 
historical inequities and patterns of marginalization. Using title security as an 
incentive to lease one’s land to the bio-ethanol corporation undermines that 
rationale and re-establishes that same yoke—albeit under a different modality 
and to a different principal. It effectively leads to a deepening of the inequality 
in social property relations. 
The danger of having this practice legitimized and normalized is that, as 
Danny Carranza29, Secretary General of Katarungan, a national federation of 
farmers puts it, “it might lead to the day when the state acts on demands for 
agrarian reform only when these demands are made in the glossy language of 
designer lawyers and with the surgical efficiency of corporations.” But beyond 
                                                
27 Acasili, interview. 
28 Actual phraseology in Republic Act 7905, otherwise known as “An Act to 
Strengthen the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in the Philippines”, February 
23, 1995. 
29 Personal interview with Danilo Carranza, Secretary General of Katarungan, 20 July 
2011 (hereinafter, Carranza, interview). 
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that, it will lead to an invariable reframing of small-holder titles: instead of 
being seen as outcomes of redistributive justice, claimed as a matter of right 
and not as a matter of “reward”, it becomes the consequence of acquiescence 
to capital and subservience to the market.  
5.3 The corporation as “biased mediator” of land disputes 
While it is the state through the Department of Agrarian Reform that resolves 
land disputes, the inability of the parties to access legal counsel makes whoever 
can provide legal assistance a de facto mediator to the dispute—essentially, the 
party that wins the dispute is the party that has the benefit of legal counsel, 
ergo, the entity that chooses who to give the legal counsel to is effectively the 
entity that mediates the dispute. 
Therefore it is the corporation that is, for all intents and purposes, the 
mediator of land disputes, and because it has a material interest in the 
resolution of the dispute (it will subsequently lease the land from the legitimate 
title holder) it is a “biased mediator”, biased in favour of the party seeking to 
have the land titled. 
In the words of one of the respondents, to which the rest of the 
respondents agreed, “kung may away sa lupa, ipasok mo nalang sa ECOFUEL para 
maayos ang gulo at magkakaroon ka ng titulo, libre.” (in cases of disputes over 
ownership, the solution is to lease the land to ECOFUEL and the mess will be 
sorted out for free.) Foremost in their minds which they enthusiastically shared 
is the story of one Nora Rapio, a former resident in Barangay Alibadabad who 
was having an altercation with her neighbour on who has a rightful claim to the 
property. Nora sought the assistance of ECOFUEL. ECOFUEL assisted her 
and afterwards, when she had secured ownership of the land, she leased the 
land to them.  
Carranza raised an interesting question: 
What happens when there are two parties in dispute over a property – one party 
wants to enter into a contract to produce bio-ethanol and another wants to plant 
corn? If the issue is brought to ECOFUEL to facilitate a solution and generate 
title to one, who do you think will be given the title? What happens when it turns 
out that the corn planter has a stronger claim?30 
John Tampo’s answer to this question when posed to him was 
unequivocal. “The one with the stronger claim will get the title. We do not 
deliberately facilitate titles and lease lands of those with weak claims.31” To 
support this, he recounted the story of a landholding in the middle of a dispute 
between the descendants of the second marriage of the original title holder and 
the brother of the deceased spouse of the first marriage. According to Tampo, 
“ECOFUEL proceeded to uproot every single one of the sugarcane crops 
planted on the 2.9 has. property.”32  
                                                
30 Ibid. 
31 Tampo, interview. 
32 Ibid. 
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While it may be a stretch to imagine that ECOFUEL, by deliberate design, 
would knowingly facilitate the titling of a claim it knows to be weak so that it 
may lease the property and convert it to a feedstock site, the mere provision of 
lawyers and assistance of surveyors alone privileges the  land claim that it 
assists, especially when in contrast, the adverse claim has virtually no resources 
from which it may draw support. It becomes even more problematic when one 
considers that the government agency tasked to implement agrarian reform 
and distribute titles has unequivocally thrown its support behind the bio-
ethanol program.  
5.4 Titling, “legibility” and the language of the market 
As a last point of this chapter, we turn to and borrow from James Scott the 
notion of “legibility”—the practice of statecraft that reduces to “legible” 
shorthand (1998:33) the complex, illegible scripts that underlie and define 
relationships, politics and structures at the level of the community. We extend 
this argument to look at land titling as yet another articulation of this 
compulsive desire for legibility—but serving not only the interests of statecraft 
but far more profoundly, the interests of capital. 
It was Tampo himself who said that “ECOFUEL assists in titling so it 
knows what it can get and what it cannot33”—a seemingly straightforward and 
innocuous statement that becomes less so when one considers the implications 
attached to it in the context of the rural countryside.  
“Land ownership and land classification in Isabela make a messy and 
complicated picture,” says Jan van der Ploeg34, a researcher from the University 
of Leiden who has conducted extensive research spanning over a decade in the 
province of Isabela. “What it says on paper is not how it is on the ground. 
Titles have been issued on the basis of fraudulent claims. Arbitrary delineations 
and classifications have been made that do not reflect actual land use.” 
Against this problematic backdrop we look at the interventions 
undertaken by the bio-ethanol corporation to “assist” farmers secure private 
titles to their land. At its essence is not only the reduction of land to a 
commodifiable asset, but also the reduction of everything related to land – the 
messy and convoluted relations of the people that work it and define their lives 
by it, the visible and invisible processes that determine who does what, why, 
and to whom, the rules that determine how ownership and possession are 
negotiated and asserted, whether or not this reflects the rules of the state – to 
the only language that the market understands. Everything is reduced to the 
relationship of buyer and seller, all other relations are negated and invisibleized.  
Tampo explained in his interview that ECOFUEL embarks on land titling 
assistance so the land can be appropriated for lease without threat of future 
claims. He disclosed that ECOFUEL is currently engaged in a dispute with the 
National Council on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) because the government 
                                                
33 Ibid. 
34 Personal interview with Prof. Jan Van der Ploeg, University of Leiden, 22 June 
2011. 
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agency is claiming 40,000 has. of land as ancestral domain of two indigenous 
groups: the Agtas and Kalingas. Tampo then quoted himself as saying in a 
meeting the NCIP Provincial Officer, “If at all we have encroached upon 
ancestral domain, show us your CADT.35” A CADT is a Certificate of 
Ancestral Domain Title, evidencing that a parcel of land is considered ancestral 
domain belonging to an indigenous community. In such a circumstance, the 
corporation—if bent on investing in the area—would also have to secure the 
community’s Free Prior and Informed Consent or FPIC.  
The statement “show us your CADT” is an interesting one, revelatory of 
the orthodox propensity to look at titles as the exclusive and conclusive 
determinant of a landholding’s ownership. Indeed, titles are indicative of a 
landholding’s legal ownership, but in the complex rubric of Isabela, it obscures 
an entire amalgam of claims, competing rights and contested arenas. Too, and 
less theoretically, it obscures the easily verifiable fact that Agtas and Kalingas 
had in fact been residing in the area claimed since, to use the legal jargon, time 
immemorial. For communities such as these, there is reason to fear that the 
title-generating frenzy already being started—with the assistance and 
pocketbook of ECOFUEL—will permanently silence all other just claims that 
are not necessarily protected by the veneer of formal legality.  
That titles serve as conduit to capital, that they reduce the complex 
transcripts of agrarian societies to the lexicon of the market where only 
economic efficiency is privileged, may be precisely Hernando de Soto’s notion 
of what development entails. But the variegated outcomes of this 
“development”, its differential effects on different classes of people,  indeed 
the enclosures that they create, as manifest in the narrative of the bio-ethanol 
farmers of Isabela, are perhaps what de Soto and his supporters steadfastly 
refuse to see. 
6   When formal rights don’t translate to lived realities: 
analysis and reflections 
This study has aimed to contribute to the present land grabbing discourse by 
looking at the nexus or relationship between land titling and land grabbing 
under conditions where there is no outright dispossession or physical 
expulsion, but rather, small-holder farmers’ integration into the market 
economy under terms that exploit their structural disadvantages. The orthodox 
formulation appears to suggest that titles have a curative function in class-
asymmetric societies – they narrow the gap between the powerful and the 
powerless by providing an extra tool for the latter. Using empirical evidence 
gathered from Isabela, Northern Philippines, as well as interviews with 
Philippine policy makers, my investigation has rendered the following 
conclusions. 
Firstly, there appears to be no correspondence between the possession or 
acquisition of formal property rights (titles) and the degree to which small-
                                                
35 Tampo, interview. 
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holder farmers are incorporated into the market system, in that farmers with 
titles and farmers without titles are similarly exposed to adverse incorporation. 
The determination that the incorporation is adverse is based on the indicators 
identified in Chapter 3. The rate of the lease rental, normally PhP5,000.00 per 
ha. per year is unconscionable and oppressive. Even the head of the PADCC 
Mariz Agbon expressed his disbelief when informed that the farmers were 
getting only that amount36. Upon hiring as farm workers, they are paid far 
lower than the minimum wage,  at rates that offer no prospects for security or 
accumulation. (Phillips, 390). Whilst cognizant of the fact that they are getting 
the raw end of the deal, and while they may be losing out on more sustainable 
outcomes in the future, they latch onto these one-sided options which Wood 
had called “desirable short-term and immediate outcomes” (2000:19). More 
importantly, they had no opportunity or leverage to negotiate these terms with 
the corporation because of the asymmetries in power relationships.  
Secondly, it is not the farmers confronting land grabbing who necessarily 
benefit from land titling, a populist notion central to the neo-liberal land titling 
advocacy. Neither is it always true that investor corporations seek out untitled 
landholdings. On the contrary, field work has shown that it is the bio-ethanol 
company aggressively pushing for titling – primarily so that  its investment and 
capital can be adequately protected. In the preceding chapter, have I tried to 
identify the many possible problems with this kind of arrangement: the 
incentivization of lease agreements at the expense of owner-cultivatorship and 
control, the agenda-driven and biased  mediation of the corporation of titling 
disputes, and also, the reduction of complex agrarian relations into the lexicon 
of the market.  
But why is this so? What processes and policies are responsible for these 
outcomes? I began by looking into the policy framework in the Philippines, 
arguing that this framework provides narrow opportunities for titling to 
provide truly equitable outcomes for the rural poor. I argued that the current 
and legal and policy regime surrounding foreign investment in agriculture, 
fundamentally premised on the neo-classical formulation that economic 
efficiency should determine where and how assets and resources ought to be 
utilized – only deepens adverse incorporation and makes farmers more 
vulnerable to the threats of global land grabbing. This is in contrast to the 
dominant viewpoint that an enabling regulatory framework and adherence to 
the rule of law can yield development possibilities from the farmland 
investment. I attempted to demonstrate that it is not only the existence of the 
regulatory framework that is required, but the direction toward which it is tilted 
and the class to which it is biased.  
The neat and uncluttered logic that land titling mitigates the risks of land 
grabbing and allows title-holders to reap the benefits of farmland investment 
will not hold against the messy and cluttered relationships and processes that 
define and characterize the Philippine rural countryside. The key variable that 
neo-liberal land titling proponents forget – and in fact that the entire neo-
classical movement forgets—are the asymmetries in power relations, the extent 
                                                
36 Agbon, interview. 
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to which players can negotiate the terms with which they are incorporated into 
the market. To quote Cousins (2009: 898), this version of reality assumes that 
“there are no classes with opposed interests who engage in struggles over the 
distribution of income, the organization of production, or conditions of work”. 
We look at the typology below to facilitate understanding: 
TABLE 3 
 Typology 
 
T1. Title, Symmetrical 
 
 
T2. Without title, Asymmetrical 
 
T3. Without Title, Symmetrical 
 
 
T4. Title, Asymmetrical 
T1 obviously benefits the most from any investment deal, and in fact from 
any relationship involving his or her property. T1 contemplates a regular 
landowner, perhaps with assets aside from land, imbued with social, political 
and economic capital. To expedite discussion, we leave T1 out of the 
discussion and center analysis on T2, T3 and T4.  
If the orthodox narrative is correct, T4 is placed at a greater advantage 
over T2 and T3, because he has the title and T2 and T3 do not. But the 
research on the round demonstrate the flaw of this logic. T4 and T2 were more 
or less on the same bargaining plane with respect to the corporation. In fact, 
there were instances wherein T2 received higher in terms of lease rentals than 
T4 because other factors were used to determine the rate of lease rental, such 
as access to road, soil quality, and the like. T3 is particularly interesting: we 
remember once more the farm guard and “interim supervisor” who had said 
that his life had improved tremendously after the ECOFUEL project. He had 
no title over the landholding he had leased to the company. He received high 
income and was not subjected to the uncertainties in income of the farm 
workers. He also enjoyed direct access to the corporation and its provincial 
office.  He enjoyed these privileges not because of titling (indeed, he had none) 
but because he was valuable to the corporation and there was reduced 
asymmetry between himself and the corporation. 
 In fine, if the research findings are any indication to go by, T1 and T3 are 
more privileged, and T2 and T4 are more prejudiced – disputing the orthodox 
formulation that would have T1 and T4 as  more privileged, and T2 and T3 as 
more prejudiced. 
Asking  the question why land titling is so aggressively pushed to mitigate 
the risks of land grabbing and cause farmers to benefit from the investment 
then leads to investigation of the master narrative of the dominant 
framework—the mitigation of risk, maximization of gain. If land titling does 
not mitigate risk for the farmer (though it certainly mitigates risk for the 
investor), then why is it peddled under the populist wagon? 
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In the end, land titling cannot mitigate risk, because the risks cannot be 
mitigated whilst keeping intact the exploitative processes that have 
characterised relations between the capitalist productive sub-sector and the 
peasant productive sub-sector. The “mitigation of risk” logic that underlies the 
land titling agenda is ultimately the ‘legitimisation’ of  an inherently unjust  and 
inequitable process through the use of the neo-classical lexicon of “risk-
benefit” whilst obscuring the reality that the vulnerability accruing to local 
communities by global land grabbing is an essential feature that feeds and sustains 
what is primarily a project of the global capitalist enterprise. 
7   Conclusion 
I began my research by asking this question:  
To what extent do formal property rights (i.e. land titles) determine and 
reconfigure development outcomes for small-holder farmers confronting 
the market-driven pressures of large-scale farmland investment or global 
land grabbing? 
My answer is this. The extent to which formal property rights determine 
and reconfigure development outcomes for small-holder is invariably mediated 
by the class relationships in a particular agrarian setting. In a setting defined by 
asymmetrical power relations, i.e., where there is a peasant small-holder 
subsector and there is a capitalist sub-sector, there is basis to critique the 
orthodox formulation that land titles, always and in themselves, provide some 
degree of leverage to farmers across all property regimes.  
If favourable developmental outcomes for small-holder farmers are 
sought, the empirical findings show that formal titles in the hands of the 
peasants cannot neutralise that market-driven pressures that bear upon them. 
The extent to which land titles can reconfigure outcomes and protect from 
adverse incorporation  is minimal.  
If, on the other hand, what one seeks to ferret out are unfavourable 
outcomes, the empirical findings show that titles can be instrumentalised to 
facilitate and expedite incorporation – compromising long-term welfare-
enhancing prospects for small-holder farmers.  
Indeed, taking these two key findings together, not only do titles not 
insulate, they might also lubricate—removing the barriers and chokepoints that 
block capital’s “hydroelectric plant37” thereby making the incorporation of 
farmers into the value chain more efficient and capital’s vise-like grip on their 
assets and resources more entrenched. 
After attempting to demonstrate that in cases of adverse incorporation, 
land titling does not necessarily mitigate the risks of land grabbing, and in some 
cases, achieves the opposite effect, a crucial point of reflection is this: 
                                                
37 "the formal property system is capital's hydroelectric plant ... the place where capital 
is born" (De Soto, 2000: 10). 
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Do land titling  outcomes shape and recast agrarian relations, or do agrarian relations 
shape and recast land titling outcomes? 
Acceding to the first proposition means viewing land titles as magic 
wands, curing class discrepancies and historical iniquities by the mere 
expedient of delivering a small piece of paper to a small-holder farmer. On the 
other hand, acceding to the second proposition ignores all evidence of the 
ameliorative effects of land titling across property regimes.  
The objective of this paper in trying to frame and problematise the nexus 
between land titling and land grabbing is not so much to cast land titling into 
two unmalleable, inflexible extremes but to demonstrate the vast room for 
variance in outcomes and the politics and processes implicated in these 
variances. The Isabela example on land grabbing is just one of several possible 
permutations of the titling-grabbing nexus. Given the frenetic pace of 
contemporary farmland investments, there will be many more permutations in 
the years to come. The point is that these permutations do not take place by 
happenstance,  nor are they the product of random variables in the 
environment. These are the result of asymmetries and incongruities in power 
relations, reinforced over time and reproduced in multiple ways. Quoting Hall 
(2003: 36), “rights cannot be enforced so long as the fundamental inequalities 
in which social relations in the countryside are grounded remain intact.” Land 
titles confer a right, but do not guarantee its effective exercise. 
To this end, there is merit perhaps in recasting the land titling discourse 
and changing the way we view land title: from one that views it as an end to 
one that views it as a means; from one that views it as a culmination of struggle, to 
one that views it as a platform of struggle. Its malleability has made it of 
convenient use to Capital—deployed in order to tighten its hold on resources 
and to deepen the enclosure regimes that it has managed to create. However, it 
is precisely this malleability that can also make it a site of contestation: 
“weapons of the weak” (to paraphrase Scott) rather than rewards to the weak. 
Land titles alone cannot ipso facto mitigate the risks of land grabbing—but 
active, organized rural communities can wield them strategically not only to 
mitigate the risks of land grabbing, but to resist it altogether, in the end 
translating the legal empowerment that titles provide to empowerment that 
permeates their felt realities. 
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